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
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
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INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH BASED ESSAY

SUBJECT:

"Security Assistance Program Administration"

BY:

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ON:

19 April 1982



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INTRODUCTION

Most Army officers with more than twenty years of service can reflect on their experiences and recall various assignments with mixed emotions. Combat arms officers, in particular, tend to group their assignments into two major categories: duties with troop units and on various staffs. It has been my observation that "troop duty" experiences are all rather similar, that is "... once you've heard one, you've heard them all." The most interesting experiences I have read and heard about are those from staff assignments. With the requirement to write an essay as part of the U.S. Army War College curriculum this year, I thought that selecting a subject that I had experienced while serving in a rather "exotic" staff assignment might not only be interesting to my reader(s), but allow me the opportunities to renew my knowledge and become current on the subject, while at the same time, make it a matter of record, so-to-speak.

In August 1973, as a Major with six years in grade, I was asked if I could terminate my duties as a Plans Officer at the United States Readiness Command Headquarters (Tampa, Florida), and report to the Defense Attache Office (DAO) at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria, in two weeks to become the Security Assistance Organization (SAO) officer. In the months preceding that inquiry, I had applied for and had been accepted into the attache program; as a matter-of-fact, I was scheduled to begin training the following January, to become the Assistant Army Attaché in Sweden, ... so this offer came as a complete surprise. It seemed that the individual previously slated for the position in Vienna, had a family crises suddenly develop, and I was nominated as a last minute substitution. The big question in my mind was, "How fluent must I

be in the language?" I had studied German in high school and at the U.S. Military Academy as a cadet, but was "cold" in the language, and had never had a utilization tour. To make a long story short, I agreed to take the assignment with the stipulation that everyone concerned must accept me as "ill prepared," but willing to learn. I had no idea how naive I really was, until I arrived in Vienna, four weeks later.

My treatise addresses the subject of security assistance from an operator's level; i.e., that person, or those persons, representing the United States Government (USG) for the purpose of administering a security assistance program to the military of a host nation (HN). In an effort to make the essay current, I summarize the latest directives, regulations and publications which drive/regulate security assistance operations from the "top, down" to the HN. Interspersed are references to current sources that I found while researching in the USAWC Library, as well as a number of personal observations gained from almost four years as the SAO officer attached to the DAO at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, Austria. I hasten to add, that the personal experiences I describe were judiciously selected for their general applicability to other SAO's, in other host countries, and to various periods of U.S. security assistance activities.

PART I

"The Pre-Came Wars-Up"

In this part, and throughout the remainder of the essay, the term "Military Assistance Advisory Group" or MAAG shall include Joint U.S. Military Advisory Groups, Military Missions, Military Assistance Groups, U.S. Military Groups, and U.S. Military Representatives within a U.S. Diplomatic Mission conducting Department of Defense (DOD) security assistance activities. These MAAG's are joint service groups and usually operate under the unified commander tasked by DOD to plan and program security assistance for designated host countries.¹ Additionally, a relatively new security assistance organization is called an ODC (Office of Defense Cooperation); it is normally manned by three DOD/military personnel and works directly with a Chief of Diplomatic Mission who may request up to three additional personnel to accomplish MAAG type functions.²

The very nature and extent of security assistance activities are determined by the incumbent President of the United States, and how powerful he is with the Congress, and how determined both are to derive the maximum return of its application as part of our nation's foreign policy. Post World War II (WWII) security assistance has varied with each President's administration, but its broad roles have remained relatively constant as: representational, informational and managerial; these were further defined in the quote that follows.

Representational roles were quite broad and were generally an effort to demonstrate a United States presence and concern for host military and security problems by giving advice and assistance; by maintaining liaison between the United States defense establishment and that of the host country; and by establishing and maintaining a


relationship of mutual trust and confidence with host country's military establishment.

Informational roles were highly dependent upon success in performing representational roles. Access to key military and government personnel in the host country was highly instrumental for gathering field information about country needs, wants, fears, or attitudes, as well as internal domestic developments that might relate to United States security interests. MAAG's reported on host government plans and programs relevant to the Unified Command; provided specifically requested reports for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military departments; regularly reported on host government's utilization of defense articles provided as grant aid; and often reported on any problems with recently purchased arms, services and training.

Managerial roles included: assisting host governments in arranging purchase of United States weapons and services; assisting DSAA and the military departments in Foreign Military Sales negotiations; assisting United States commercial representatives who wished to sell defense articles and services to host governments; assisting United States military departments in delivering security assistance to recipients; assisting host governments in meeting contractual obligations related to grant aid, Foreign Military Sales, or excess defense articles; providing training or advice to host governments concerning plans, programs, budgets, or military resources; assisting DSAA or ISA on matters relating to joint research and development with host country; and performing other tasks if specifically requested by competent authority.

Focusing on the subject of administering security assistance as viewed from the operator's standpoint, it is important to identify the key "players" at that level. The Chief of the MAAG or SAO works directly for the Chief of Diplomatic Mission (the Ambassador) to the HN. As depicted on a simplified organization chart that follows (page 5), the MAAG is equal in advisory capacity to that of the Defense Attaché (DATT) with respect to the Ambassador, regardless of differences in military rank/rate.

The second "player" is the HN's Ministry of Defense (MOD) which include the designated subordinate points of contact (POC's) or counterparts with whom the MAAG elements coordinate. The number of POC's and size of the MAAG depend upon the magnitude of the U.S. Security Assis-



Channels of Direction/Communication

LEGEND: Normal = _____
 Coordination = -X-X-X-
 Optional = - - - -

tance Program being administered in the host country.

Finally, the last major "player" from the operator's point of view is the Unified Commander within whose geographical territory the HQ is located. Again, referring to the chart on page 5, note that the Unified Commander provides the MAAG Chief direct access to the JCS and key DOD agencies responsive to SAO requirements. We will return to the relationships between these "players" and others in Part II of my essay, where I discuss "team work" and the "game."

Before leaving the subject of "players," I think it is important to look at the selection and preparatory processes for SAO personnel. The DOD Directive 2000.10, SUBJECT: Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel, dated 17 January 1972,⁶ is soon to be republished, but one of the editors of the DISAM Newsletter⁷ told me that as far as Section IV, the "Criteria for Selection," is concerned, it will remain essentially unchanged:

A. General Criteria- Military and civilian personnel assigned to serve in a MAAG will possess the demonstrated personal and professional qualifications necessary to carry out effectively the functions to which they are assigned.

B. Limitations- Personnel will not normally be selected for MAAG service under the following limitations:

1. Officer, enlisted or civilian personnel whose records reflect a history of personal or financial misconduct. Consideration will also be given, for an accompanied assignment, to family compatibility to the place and type of duty, to include health of dependents, size of family and age of children, all in consideration of the social and environmental situation of the locale.

2. Officer, enlisted or civilian personnel entering their last tour of duty prior to statutory retirement.

3. Officer, O-5 and below who, having been considered (in current grade) in the primary zone for promotion, fails selection by an official promotion board.

Continuing, the directive indicates that following selection, individuals will be subjected to a four phase preparatory sequence to be completed

prior to overseas deployment. Included in these preparation phases are requirements such as: Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) refresher training, language training, and (now) successful completion of a specified course taught at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM),⁹ as a minimum. The ultimate objective of the selection/training of SAO personnel is best capsulized in the following excerpt from DOD Directive 2000.10:

Those U.S. personnel serving overseas in MAAG's (SAO's) perform functions of great importance to the execution of established U.S. defense policy. In the foreign country in which they serve, they are the direct representatives of the Secretary of Defense engaged in carrying out his responsibilities for Security Assistance. In a period of a progressive reduction of U.S. military presence in overseas areas, the presence and activities of the MAAG's (SAO's) that continue in these areas assume increasingly greater importance to U.S. security objectives. The MAAG (SAO) members are primary links between the defense officials of the U.S. and foreign countries. Their duties require them to be in frequent contact with these senior officials to provide assistance and advice on appropriate security issues, and to supervise programs under which defense materiel and training are provided to the country. Clearly visible now, but resulting from an evolving defense force situation in the individual host country, are changes in the form of advice and assistance needed by the host. Where in earlier times attention was directed in large measure to the equipping and training of tactical field units, attention now must be weighted increasingly to higher level joint and service host country staffs in assisting and advising in the management of defense resources and the development and operation of a total national force. This trend, which reflects a most desirable movement toward national self-sufficiency, requires the presence in the MAAG (SAO) of a high caliber individual possessing the attitude, education and professional competence necessary to sustain the trend. It is therefore essential that those U.S. personnel engaged in Security Assistance activities receive special attention in their selection and training.¹⁰

At this juncture, it is appropriate to discuss the functions a MAAG (SAO) is expected to accomplish in part, and frequently, in total. As mentioned earlier, the size of an SAO is determined by the magnitude of the program being administered in a particular country. The smallest

SAO occurs where a DATT (Defense Attaché) is tasked to perform whatever SAO functions are deemed necessary in a particular HN, hence he wears two hats. The pitfalls of this "dual mission dilemma" are addressed later in Part II of the essay. The following is a current list of major MAAG (SAO) functions:¹¹

1. Logistics Management
2. Transportation
3. Fiscal Management
4. Contract Administration
5. Supervisory Control of:
 - a. Mobile Training Teams (MTT)
 - b. Technical Assistance Teams (TAT)
 - c. Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT)

Any one or all of the first four functions (above) could be a part or all of a "country program" requiring security assistance management action. Additional, related functions, which may be included in the four major functions, are:¹²

1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Case Management
2. Training Management
 - a. FMT (Foreign Military Trainees)
 - b. IMETP (International Military Education and Training Program)
3. Plans
4. Monitoring
 - a. MAP (Military Assistance Program) Equipment
 - b. IMETP Materiel/Training

The preceding lists of SAO functions are not only impressive, but pose difficult challenges to the operators in the HN who may or may not be prepared/trained for their duties. Hence, over the years, a number of "rule books" have been written to provide necessary guidance for SAO personnel to follow in the conduct of their duties. The problems with

the rule books (i.e.: multi-service/departmental regulations/directives, instructions, circulars, memorandums, manuals and handbooks), are that a user cannot read, recall and apply the contents of them all. This burden of "too much" information/guidance is particularly apparent in the smaller SAO's. With the foundation of DISAM (Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management) in 1977, the graduate SAO operators have consistently arrived at their posts better informed and prepared to manage and accomplish their duties. Furthermore, the DISAM Staff has published the single most valuable "survival manual" for SAO personnel to study and use on the job, titled The Management of Security Assistance. Now in its second edition (May 1981), the authors caution that the text is to be used in an academic environment;¹³ but in the opinion of this reader, it is an ideal "users' manual" and provides the direction necessary to research and find answers to the myriad of problems associated with SAO operations in the field. The second most valuable rule book, that no SAO office can exist without, is the MAST (Military Assistance and Sales Manual) authored/published by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). This text is continuously revised as policies and guidance change, but it sets forth the policies, procedures and responsibilities pertinent to the administration of security assistance programs within DOD. The MAST is divided into three major parts:¹⁴

- I. General Information
- II. Grant Aid (MAP)
- III. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

When I was in the field as an SAO operator, before DISAM and without the benefit of any preparatory training, the MAST was my "Bible". As indicated earlier, more guidance in a variety of rule book formats is

available for SAO personnel to use, but I personally believe that the two just mentioned are the most comprehensive "basic references" for SAO operations nowadays.

PART II

"Play Ball!"

One important point to remember about administering a security assistance program is that no two programs are identical. Like similarities between foreign countries, however, security assistance programs can be similar in specific aspects such as a particular model of equipment, quantities required, supporting and training packages, etc.; but even those are only "similarities," - and rare, at that.

Having served in a situation where the DATT was "two hatted," but had the advantage of having me and one sergeant attached as his SAO augmentation element, I became aware of certain incongruities that stemmed from what I earlier referred to as the "dual mission dilemma." In that I was a last minute substitute for the position, and arrived directly from the United States without any SAO preparatory training (... so that I could have a five day overlap and cohost a "turn-over" party with my predecessor before he departed ...), I was so confused and overwhelmed by the time the dust settled, that I did not know what I was doing for the first six months of my tour. Until I reported to my Unified Command Headquarters, which provided the SAO augmentation element spaces to the DAO, nearly two months later, I was almost convinced that "security assistance" was a cover title for spying on the HN's military. During the early days, I found myself being tasked to obtain specific information about activities that had nothing to do with the HN's security assistance program administration. So, when I paid my initial office call on the Director of Security Assistance, J-7, at the Unified Command Headquarters, I was astounded when he said (in effect), "...don't let that DATT use you to collect intelligence for him!"

I worried that perhaps I "was closing the barn door after the horse was stolen," but did not say anything. The next surprises came from visiting the various elements of the J-7 Staff; the action officers were very forgiving, since they knew the circumstances of my short-fused assignment, but they were candid and quick to point out that my "house was not in order" back in Vienna! It seemed that reports were late, slipshod, and sometimes even missing. Before I departed the J-7 Directorate, I enrolled in the Unified Command's next (recurring) SAO Course. Needless to say, when I got back to my SAO office, my NCO's cheerful welcome was short lived, and our relationship with the DAO for intelligence taskings became somewhat strained. In the months that followed, and in later years, I was told by several of my HN counterparts and friends that they were cautioned about dealing with the SAO augmentation element of the DAO since it had been identified by the HN intelligence community as a "covert" collection activity for the DATT. These same associates were very glad to see my office re-focus on its security assistance functions, which steadily improved as time went on.

An interesting adjunct to this dilemma is quoted from the "Intelligence Function Analyses," by the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy:

Some of the most important information to reach the intelligence community in Washington grows out of the reporting activities of U.S. embassies around the world. This includes not only the extensive reporting by Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) on political, economic, and social developments in their respective countries and on the foreign policy of the governments they deal with, but also reports by American attaches responsible for agricultural, financial, labor and military affairs. Other important information arises out of the reports of AID Missions, USIS posts, and Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAG's).

Several obstacles exist to making this reporting more useful

and responsive to the needs of the intelligence community. The first is simply a problem of understanding. To the typical FSO, intelligence is basically what is collected clandestinely by an agent — or, at the other end of the technological spectrum — by advanced technological methods. The FSO seldom looks upon his reports as part of the intelligence collection activities. He often points out that if he were regarded simply as an intelligence collector by the local government, many of his sources of information would dry up. Yet to an intelligence analyst the conversations of a U.S. diplomat with his foreign counterparts are a very important type of raw intelligence, just as are the studies done by the embassy personnel on conditions and trends within a particular country. There is no point in trying to obtain an agreed definition of what is or is not raw intelligence. What is needed on the part of the embassy personnel is an awareness that these reports do enter the intelligence process, and more systematic training and evaluation of such personnel in view of their inescapable role.¹⁵

The bottom line of that excerpt makes sense to me, after my personal experiences. I am of the opinion, however, that intelligence collection should be left in the hands of the experts, and that FSO's and SAO's should continue to "muddle" on, doing their duties and writing reports based on their assigned functions; independent and separate from the agents and analysts.

Recall that in Part I of this essay I addressed those that I called the "players." What follows is an extension on one in particular, the Ambassador, and a very important role he plays as Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, i.e.: chief of the "country team." Two excerpts from The Management of Security Assistance text are helpful and appropriate at this point:

The "country team" is the principal means by which a mission bonds itself together as a cooperative, coordinated and well informed staff action in unison.¹⁶

The country team has no legal standing, nor are its composition or functions laid down anywhere in a formal document. It is essentially what the ambassador makes it.¹⁷

The composition of a country team varies, but typical membership might or would include the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), Chiefs

of the Political and Economic Sections, the Security Assistance Organization Chief, Agency for International Development (AID) mission and U.S. International Communications Agency (USICA) representatives, and the Defense Attaché. In my case, as the SAO augmentee to the DATT, the DATT was "dual hatted" so I was not a regular member of the country team. I found the following quotation about what country teams do:

The types of problems considered by the full team also vary widely. In some posts, the group may confine its collective attention to such major questions as proposing or reviewing the annual military and economic aid programs, the country information program for the year, and other basic matters. Elsewhere, the need for coordinated decisions and actions might call for country team consultation on a wide array of day-to-day questions.

Hence, it is through the country team forum that the Security Assistance Organization receives its charter and the extent of the program is determined based on the perceived needs of the HN government.

Like the old cliché says, "You can't tell the players without a program;" — there is another "player" that deserves comment, the host nation, itself. When I was first thrown into the midst of an "on-going" security assistance program, I never had time to consider just how it got started. In retrospect, and with the luxury of time to research, I realize that every program the United States Government (USG) has become involved in, came about through different circumstances. The common denominators are, however, the Departments of State, Defense, and a host nation. Without the impetus of a request for security assistance by a host country, and the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and Defense, SAO's would not exist. That is not to say that our Diplomatic Missions overseas have not suggested or encouraged an HN to ask for U.S. security assistance; on the contrary, we have done precisely that to counter Soviet Military Assistance efforts in various countries.

But my point here, is that the United States does not "push" security assistance; it usually waits until an HN asks for it, and then gives the request due consideration.

When a host country participates in a U.S. security assistance program, it usually does it through its "Foreign" and "Defense" Ministries. The SAO becomes involved with subordinate offices designated by the HN Ministry of Defense (MOD), and those vary in accordance with the country and extent of the program. Some interesting aspects of conducting business between the SAO operators and MOD counterparts evolve as a result of diplomatic or intelligence community "quid pro quo" arrangements effected unbeknownst to the SAO; I return to that quandary, later in the essay. Nowadays it is becoming "more the rule, than the exception" for countries receiving USG equipment and logistic support (repair parts, ammunition, etc.) to establish "Freight Forwarders" in the Continental United States (CONUS); sometimes these offices are established at a major port, but many are operated from HN embassies located in Washington, D.C. In a few cases, foreign countries establish entire "MOD Procurement" offices in CONUS, eliminating the requirement for the USG to field SAO's in those particular countries. Another intriguing facet of the business results from situations where a HN has an SAO in its capitol and a Freight Forwarder in Washington, and attempts to use both in an effort to "get a better deal;" I return to that point later, also.

Of all of the visitors that an SAO receives, hosts and deals with, the commercial military sales representatives stand out most vividly in my memory for some of the following reasons:

1. The type of information they sought from us and the HN.

2. The information/feed-back they could provide us.
3. Their naivety, ignorance and presumptiveness.
4. Their insight, knowledge, experience and continuity with the HN.
5. Their unscrupulous, unethical, underhanded sales techniques.
6. Their reliability and veracity.
7. Their ability/inability to speak the HN language.

SAO personnel can expect to meet numerous U.S. and foreign nationals representing either and/or U.S. and foreign military arms producers and suppliers. These representatives may be referred to the SAO from offices internal to the embassy, by formal correspondence from the firm to the embassy or to the SAO directly, and in some instances they may walk in right off the street, unannounced. It does not take long after meeting a few of these salesmen to realize that the old cliché "Merchant of Death" might better be replaced by "Carpet Bagger" to describe some of them. Most American Military Officers are appalled by the caliber of about 50% of these representatives for some of the negative reasons that I listed above. Exceptional sales/service representatives seem to be those with prior, honorable, military service, who speak one or more foreign languages (and if they don't; have the sense not to ask the SAO to provide them with a translator). Dealing with commercial military salesmen is one of the greatest challenges facing an SAO; the procedures outlined in the MASMI¹⁹ do not begin to forewarn unsuspecting SAO personnel of "real world" sales activities that take place at HN level. What follow are some highlights of some realities learned through experience.

Regardless of nationality, there are two basic types of salesmen encountered by security assistance personnel: "legitimate" and "less than legal." The legitimate representatives possess passports with visas, other credentials, -enjoy good reputations and usually represent firms

with previous/current DOD contracts for manufacturing and delivering U.S. military equipment. Sometimes these salesmen formally request permission through State and Defense Department channels to visit a host nation's MOD for the purpose of assessing the market for their product(s); since the approval of such a visit could lead to either a commercial or "government-to-government" sale, the SAO frequently assists in its coordination and execution. In other instances, these same representatives may suddenly appear, unannounced, and not make contact with the embassy or SAO, at all; during these visits they might make "low visibility" contacts with a variety of HN government officials to "test the water" without USG presence nearby. Very often, if the firm is large enough, the legitimate salesman will hire a local national entrepreneur to keep an eye on the HN MOD and other government officials while he is out of town; the embassy/SAO may or may not be aware of such arrangements. The legitimate salesmen can be very valuable sources of information to the SAO and country team; both "before" and "after" HN contact by the salesmen with the SAO ^{are} ~~is~~ mutually beneficial. For example, the SAO may know exactly where a salesman should go, who to see and avoid, how much of the HN budget has been set aside for the purchase of what kinds of equipment, required delivery times, modifications/specifications to the desired end item, etc. The salesman might know more about the HN MOD's desires than the SAO having just left the HN's Embassy in Washington, or he might have the latest production information on a number of weapons systems not yet released to the field; and after his visit to the MOD, he would certainly have valuable information of interest to the SAO and country team.

One cannot practice enough caution, however, with the "less than

legal" sales representatives, who for want of another description, I will refer to as "shady salesmen." (By-the-way, U.S. Embassies/SAO's seldom, if ever, deal with illegal salesmen; unless they are unlucky enough to be U.S. citizens arrested and held by HN authorities for breaking the law; then "dealing" with them is in the form of extradition proceedings.) To begin with, these individuals may be second or third country nationals representing U.S. or foreign arms producing/exporting firms. I recall a Czechoslovakian born refugee, with a West German passport who represented "Bell Agusta" of Italy, a licensed U.S. Bell Helicopter subsidiary with "exclusive rights" to sell and service Bell Helicopters in Western Europe and the Mediterranean areas. Generally, shady salesmen are unscrupulous when measured by the traditional U.S. standards of business ethics. The customs of "baksheesh" and "kick-backs" are the "norm" for shady salesmen modus operandi, and I might add, -- not frowned upon as "unusual" by many host country governmental agencies; after all, "that's life!" Here are but a few of the shady salesmen tactics that SAO's encounter:

1. Misrepresentation. They claim that the U.S. Embassy indorses their contact with the HN MOD/government for business purposes. They claim that the end item for sale is a USG DOD contract product, when it is not, or still may be under test. They mislead the HN MOD into thinking that a "commercial" purchase is more advantageous than a "government-to-government" purchase is, and/or that "follow-on support" is available through FMS (Foreign Military Sales) case for either.

2. Defamation. Attack those opposing purchases by the HN government regardless of nationality, rank/position, the truth of the accusation, etc., by every means of media available.

3. Bribery. Stop at nothing! "Everyone has a price," and they will often pay it to cinch a sale.

4. Deceit. Lie, promise, cheat, and steal; they will do them, one and all, in order to close a deal.

Fortunately, the reputations of shady salesmen usually precede them and the time worn cliché, "Let the buyer beware," is well known in many foreign languages. It is usually the "beginner" or novice shady salesman who "burns" one or two unsuspecting intermediaries before being discovered; it is ^{he} ~~then~~ that the SAO "players" must be wary of.

This treatise would not be complete without comment about the actual performance of Security Assistance Organization functions (introduced on page 8). As previously indicated, not all SAO's perform all of the functions associated with the administration of security assistance programs. The SAO functions which have been identified and quantified by the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) are now ^m committed to print in The Management of Security Assistance²⁰ text and are taught as part of the DISAM curricula. With the exception of how to handle salesmen, most of the SAO functions are described in the DISAM text book, which further directs its readers to the appropriate (correct) references; that is: regulations, directives, manuals, etc.) where very definitive guidance is provided.

The most concise description of the four primary functions performed by SAO's are extracted from a hearing transcript of the House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, on 2 March 1978:

Logistics Management. Logistics management consists of insuring proper execution of the delivery of materiel and services obtained through U.S. security assistance. It includes making the

necessary arrangements for such items as construction; receipt, movement, storage, distribution, operation and maintenance of materiel; for training; and for necessary technical services. Under this function, the MAAG (SAO) also keeps the Department of Defense informed as to problems being encountered with the U.S. logistics system and takes or recommends appropriate action to resolve them.

Transportation. Transportation activities consist of working with U.S. contractors, services and foreign armed forces concerning USG transportation policies and procedures, the freight forwarded delivery system, special procedures for delivery of munitions and other hazardous cargo; assisting the host country in developing transportation procedures, including pipeline management; due-in status reporting; assisting in locating missing cargo in the Defense Transportation System; inspecting and validating transit damage to security assistance material; assisting the host country in preparation of damage reports and claims, arranging for movement of MAP-origin materiel being returned to U.S. custody.

Fiscal Management. Fiscal management includes obtaining and providing financial information on foreign military sales cases, FMS credit agreements, MAP and IMET programs, utilization of draw-down cases, supply support arrangements, progress payment requirements for "dependable undertaking" FMS cases; serving as technical interface among the country, Security Assistance Accounting Center, DSAA Comptroller, and Service Commands responsible for fiscal matters; keeping the Chief of Mission informed on progress payment delinquencies or other fiscal matters which may require political attention.

Contract Administration. Activities in contract administration include oversight of FMS transactions and the monitoring of activities and operations of contracting officers or contracting officers; representatives (COR) and staff support to them in the administration of contracts between the government and commercial contractors. At this time, we do not envision the MAAG (SAO) assuming responsibility for actual contract administration as would normally be assigned to a contracting officer or COR. The MAAG (SAO), must however, oversee activities of attached COR's to insure that their missions are accomplished in an efficient and effective manner and are in accord with established security assistance objectives.²¹

One can readily understand that the reports and administrative actions associated with performing these four primary functions, just to satisfy the USG's side of the equation, are sufficient to keep an SAO fully occupied, but when the host nation side of it is added, the balance tilts, and the SAO activity escalates to its normal level of

turmoil and excitement. That is to say, the USG administrative requirements are relatively "run of the mill" (routine), yet quite demanding by themselves. The challenge to accomplishing any SAO function comes from the HN government interplay, and it is that aspect which makes the security assistance business one of the best jobs available in U.S. military service. No matter how well SAO personnel think they know and understand the national character/-personality of their host nation counterparts, they are more often surprised by unpredicted reactions/responses than not. Security assistance activities can be very slow one minute, but wild the next as a result of an unanticipated initiative taken by the HN MOD. The casual observer is inclined to think that administering a small security assistance program in a country like Austria, must be a "snap" compared to the extensive one being administered in Saudi Arabia; on the contrary, they are equally complex and difficult. No Security Assistance Organization has enough personnel to accomplish the multitude of tasks that need to be done;²² and a host nation need not be rich, nor have a huge defense budget with which to buy foreign military assistance.

Host nation SAO counterparts have their share of "shoppers" (procurement planners who wonder/ask what it would cost to buy a particular weapons system), who constantly seek P&A (Price and Availability) data to compare with another brand from another country, while no funds are available for such a purchase, anyway. As implied earlier, many host countries use their Freight Forwarder or Defense Attaché offices in CONUS to "shop around" ... which often results in confusion and/or embarrassment to the HN when, for example, "letters

of offer" on a particular piece of equipment are requested through the SAO in the HN on a "government-to-government" basis, while concurrently, the HN Embassy in CONUS asks for a "commercial" offer.

Administering other security assistance functions like FIE Case Management and monitoring specified programs such as MAP and DMETP are time consuming, yet personally rewarding; again from the standpoint of dealing with HN counterparts. The hours of patient research, explanation, negotiation and revision are worth it when the host nation ministry of defense expresses satisfaction or gratitude with/for the results. And since SAO training functions also rely on personal contact with the HN military, the USG stands to earn the most return on its investment with these programs than with the sale of military hardware, MAP, logistic support, etc.

I mentioned earlier in the essay (page 15) the "quid pro quo" aspect of SAO operations. Foreign Ministries and the State Department are "bean counters," which means they scrutinize each others' rosters of diplomats and officials assigned to their embassy staffs. Although Security Assistance Organizations, by definition, are not in the same business as Defense Attaché Offices are, when all is said and done, the State Department and HN governments frequently see them both as part of DOD and therefore, "one." Hence, when the U.S. Department of State talks to a HN Foreign Ministry about numbers of DOD personnel, no difference is made between DAO and SAO functions. Head counting is a particularly sensitive business when, for example, a host country wants to reduce the number of Soviet officials in the country, while the U.S. may be asking to increase the size of its SAO there at the same time. Another side of the "quid pro quo" coin, is what I call

"visitation rights," or the right to travel freely within the HN to conduct SAO business. If an SAO is tasked to inventory and report the status of MAP (Grant Aid) equipment in the hands of the HN military,²³ it is desirable to have the freedom to "come and go" at will, or at least within reasonable limitations. "Quid pro quo" means that HN officials in COMUS would be given similar freedom of movement and "visitation rights." The intrigue arises when DAO activities are equated to SAO functions, and a host country clamps down on our "visitation rights" for seemingly no reason at all, at least in the eyes of the SAO.

One of the pitfalls awaiting the novice security assistance program operator occurs when he wants to impress one of his HN counterparts; he over commits himself and/or the USG. An example might be, to promise Brigadier XXXXXX, Chief of the HN MOD Procurement Office, that the item of equipment the HN is purchasing will arrive by a certain date; or, "...we will have the answer for you from the United States, tomorrow, sir!"²⁴ These over commitments are usually not intentional, but happen out of ignorance compounded by ego. The resulting disappointment by the HN counterpart destroys any hope the novice may have had to impress him; SAO's and their counterparts are most content when their respective expectations are met.

PART III

"Sports News Wrap-up"

For as long as the United States continues to use security assistance as part of its foreign policy, and there are Security Assistance Organization positions to be filled, there is no more challenging an assignment for military personnel to have. The smaller the SAO element is, the more challenging and rewarding the work is. The opportunities for experience in working with the members of the U.S. Embassy country team, host nation ministry of defense, Unified Command Headquarters, commercial representatives, etc., are mind boggling to say the least.

Security assistance functions should not, under any circumstances, be assigned to a Defense Attache as "additional duties." The DAO missions and SAO functions must be kept separated in the eyes of all beholders. If information routinely reported to the Chief of Mission is of value to the intelligence community, then it should be discretely siphoned off at that or the country team levels and provided to the appropriate agencies. Tasking the SAO to seek information for the intelligence community degrades its effectiveness in the performance of security assistance functions. Therefore, I believe that SAO personnel should never suspect that their efforts/reports are of interest to the intelligence community. In the situations where DATT's currently perform SAO functions as additional duties, I believe that the subordinate who actually does the work should become dedicated^d to only those functions and made a member of the country team in addition to the DATT.

Finally, of all of the functions an SAO is expected to accom-

plish, that of dealing with commercial military sales representatives is the one least defined and most challenging. Recalling that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," I would caution the uninitiated SAO operator to: check credentials frequently; beware of local entrepreneurs; maintain files on every contact (for quick reference and the sake of continuity); and remember it is better to be politely leery, than terribly sorry later.

The success and effectiveness of the United States' security assistance efforts with our friends and allies are the direct result of the effort put forth by our SAO operators in the field; it has been and is their professional dedication and determination that have contributed to the facts that we have not had a war in Europe since WWII and that the USSR has not succeeded in absorbing the West yet.

END NOTES

¹Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, The Management of Security Assistance, 2d ed. (Wright Patterson AFB, May 1981), p. B-18.

²Ibid., p. B-22.

³Paul Y. Hammond, David I. Louscher and Michael D. Salomon, "Growing Dilemmas for Management of Arms Sales," Armed Forces and Society, vol. 6, no. 1, (Fall 1979), pp. 3-4.

⁴U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency, Military Assistance and Sales Manual, DOD 5105.38M, (1 August 1978), Ch. B.

⁵Headquarters Department of the Army, The Army Security Assistance Program Study Report, (Washington: HQ DA, 31 October 1977), pp. (3-1)-(3-7).

⁶Department of Defense Directive, Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel, DOD 2000.10, (17 January 1972), pp. 1-9.

⁷Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, DISAM Newsletter, vol. 4, no. 1, (Fall 1981), p. iv. Also, per telephone conversation with editor, Mr. Trapp, on 2 April 1982.

⁸HQ DA, The Army Security Assistance Program, Op. cit., pp. 3-4.

⁹DOD Directive, Selection and Training, Loc. cit.

¹⁰HQ DA, The Army Security Assistance Program, Op. cit., pp. 2-3.

¹¹DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, Op. cit., pp. (26-9)-(26-10).

¹²Ibid., pp. (26-11)-(26-12).

¹³Ibid., p. vi.

¹⁴US DSAA, Military Assistance and Sales, Op. cit., p. v.

¹⁵U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy, Appendix U: Intelligence Functions Analysis, Chairman: Robert D. Murphy, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 34.

¹⁶DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, Op. cit., pp. (26-28)-(26-29).

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 26-30.

¹⁹US DSAA, Military Assistance and Sales, Op. cit., chaps. B and H.

²⁰DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, Op. cit., inclusive.

²¹U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1979 (Part 1), Hearing, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., March 2, 1978 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 497.

²²DISAM, The Management of Security Assistance, Op. cit., p. 26-8.

²³Ibid., pp. (24-1)-(24-10).

²⁴Donald A. Dubay, "Out-of-Channel Requests," DISAM Newsletter, vol. 3, no. 4 (Summer 1981), p.91.

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